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ABSTRACT: The taxation of  the digital economy is not a new subject but its fast development 
demands a solid solution for this new way of  doing business and generating profit and growth. The 
solution for this problem should be achieved at a global level, which has turned out to be a complex 
task. Therefore, the work we aim to do here is to identify and expose the path that has been followed 
by the international community (in general), and by the European Union, in particular, for the 
taxation of  profits of  companies with a significant digital presence and to what extent the lack 
of  an unambiguous solution, within the Union, may condition its own objectives. But achieving a 
consensual solution comes with a bigger problem: is the unanimity rule established for tax policies, 
where decisions are taken by a special legislative procedure, suited for the European Union’s goal 
for a strong and dynamic single market, capable of  competing with the world’s leading economies?
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1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated a trend we have been witnessing for 
some years now, the disruption of  the pillars on which the economy as we know it 
is based. In times of  quarantine and teleworking, digital tools and e-commerce have 
become strong allies in citizens’ lives, helping mitigate the effects of  confinement. 
What used to be done physically and in person is now done online. And if  e-commerce 
is the future, taxation of  this new way of  creating value becomes an even more relevant 
issue.1
The development of  the digital economy has become a growing challenge for 
national tax systems, which were designed at a time when most companies still had 
a relevant physical presence. Incidentally, it is physical presence (whether through 
domicile or a permanent establishment) that gives governments the justification to 
exercise their tax powers. As the European Council stated already in October 2017, “an 
effective and fair taxation system fit for the digital era”.2
In fact, it is undeniable this dematerialisation of  business and the ever-increasing 
importance of  digital activities within the economy and in the daily lives of  consumers 
and economic agents in general. Whether for personal or professional reasons, 
individuals and companies rely, increasingly and on a constant basis, on digital tools.
Digitalisation is putting pressure on the European tax system and if  a minimum of  
tax harmonisation is not achieved, the European Union’s goal of  economic integration 
and the completion of  the Single Market will not be realised.
In addition, we must not forget that tax collection is an important, if  not the most 
significant, source of  revenue collection for States.
On 27 May 2020, the European Commission published a COVID-19 recovery 
plan that aims to strengthen the economies of  Member States weakened by the effects 
of  the pandemic. In this context, the creation of  new taxes on the digital economy or 
the restructuring of  national tax systems to tax activities that are not provided for in 
current legislation is one of  the Commission’s concerns.3
The work we aim to do here is to identify and expose the path that has been 
followed by the international community (in general), and by the European Union, in 
particular, for the taxation of  profits of  companies with a significant digital presence 
and to what extent the lack of  an unambiguous solution, within the Union, may 
condition its own objectives.
Not without saying that on 12 of  July of  2021, after years of  international debate, 
Finance Ministers and G20 Central Banks Governors, achieved an historical global 
agreement that may ensure a fairer taxation of  multinational companies.4
The technical details of  the agreement will be negotiated in the upcoming months 
in order to reach a final agreement in October 2021, and as soon as this final (and 
consensual) agreement is signed by all 139 Members of  the OECD, the Commission 
1 The need to find an effective response to taxing this new way of  generating value among digital 
businesses is almost like identifying the Gray Rhino that Michele Wucker talks about in her book The 
gray rhino: how to recognize and act on the obvious dangers we ignore (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2016).
2 European Council, “Leaders’ Agenda”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/media/33333/en_leaders-agenda_note-on-taxation.pdf.
3 Johan Barros, “Full steam ahead for a taxing autumn”, Tax Journal, article 116, accessed August 20, 
2021, https://www.taxjournal.com/articles/eu-watch-16-july.
4 European Commission, “Taxation: historic global agreement to ensure fairer taxation of  multinational 
enterprises”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
ip_21_3582.
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will move swiftly to propose measures for their implementation in the EU, in line with 
the EU’s tax agenda and the needs of  the Single Market.5
Although we now see the possibility of  a consensus-based global agreement, I 
think it is still relevant to look at how things evolved over the years.
2. Why is the world in need for a change?
Companies now have the possibility to choose the ideal location to conduct their 
businesses, the barrier of  proximity to the customer and supplier is greatly facilitated 
with the digital economy, and the tax system is a key factor in this choice. The evolution 
of  business models and the growth of  the digital economy have resulted in non-resident 
companies operating in a market jurisdiction quite different from the one for which the 
international tax rules were designed.
Indeed, companies may locate assets, functions or risks in low-tax jurisdictions or 
countries with preferential regimes, and thus allocate income in those locations. In the 
context of  the digital economy, rights to intangibles are often transferred to companies 
domiciled in jurisdictions where the income from those intangibles is subject to reduced 
tax rates or not at all due to the application of  a preferential regime.
The fact that a physical presence is less and less necessary in today’s typical 
business structures creates challenges for international taxation, the solution to which 
cannot be achieved unilaterally, since it requires joint and coordinated action by all 
States. Tax policy can no longer be managed within national borders alone. Aggressive 
tax planning and tax-base erosion cannot be stopped unilaterally.
The application of  current corporate tax rules to the digital economy has led 
to a mismatch between where profits are taxed and where value is created. The rules 
in force no longer fit the current context, where cross-border trade without physical 
presence has been facilitated, where companies rely heavily on intangible assets that 
are difficult to value, and where user-generated content and data collection become key 
activities for value creation for digital businesses.
Thus, the top 10 of  the largest companies in the world today are technology 
companies such as Facebook, Amazon, Alphabet 6, surpassing historical giants such as 
Ford, BMW, Boeing, Siemens, or General Electric.
The arrival of  these digital giants gave rise to  new taxation issues. 
For instance, how can Germany (or another Member State) tax profits generated 
by Facebook in Germany since Facebook has no domicile or permanent establishment 
in Germany? Or how can tax companies that use Facebook as a sales channel be taxed?
Amazon, a US multinational technology company based in Seattle, Washington, 
mostly engaged in e-commerce, cloud computing, streaming and artificial intelligence, 
considered one of  the big five technology companies, has much of  its sales in the 
Netherlands, mostly in non-digital products. However, it has no subsidiary company 
operating in the Netherlands, and no permanent establishment7 for taxation purposes. 
There is no nexus or physical connecting element that gives the Dutch Government 
the right to tax Amazon’s income generated in its territory. 
5 Answering the question on how will this be implemented in the European Union?, see European 
Commission, “Global Agreement on Corporate Taxation: frequently asked questions”, accessed 
August 20, 2021,  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pt/qanda_21_3564.
6 “Most Valuable Companies in the World – 2021”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://fxssi.com/top-
10-most-valuable-companies-in-the-world.
7 For the application of  article 5 of  the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital.
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After all, the current corporate tax rules are based on the principle that profits 
should be taxed where the value is created. However, these rules were originally 
conceived at the beginning of  the 20th century for traditional “physical” companies. 
Under the current legal framework, the right to tax is inextricably linked to physical 
presence. This means that a company’s income is taxed where it is domiciled or carries 
on business. Non-residents for tax purposes only become liable to tax in a country 
if  they have a physical presence there, in the form of  a permanent establishment. 
However, such rules are insufficient to encompass the reality of  digital activities, for 
which physical presence is no longer a necessity. In these new business models, the 
way of  generating value is genetically different from traditional trade. Thus, a paradigm 
shift in the tax system is needed to avoid a distortion of  competition with a negative 
impact on public revenue.8
Another example that I find interesting is the example of  Netflix in Italy. In 
October 2019 Italy decided to sue Netflix for tax evasion. “The Milan tribunal has opened 
the probe as the prosecutors believe Netflix has sufficient physical presence in Italy – including fiber optic 
cables and servers – to be recognized and qualified as a local business that should be paying taxes”.9
We will not get lost in the success of  this action or exploring the concept of  
permanent establishment present in Article 5 of  the Model Tax Convention on 
Income and Capital, but this brief  example serves to reinforce the idea that, with the 
development of  the digital economy, it is becoming increasingly difficult to accurately 
determine, according to the international rules in force, which country can (or should) 
tax the income of  a multinational company with digital activity.
And another question arises. Is it necessary to revisit the concept of  income/
value? When we talk about digital economy, we must quantify, define in substance, 
what is the value generated.10
In this panorama, jurisdictions that see their tax revenues affected are calling for 
a more equitable distribution of  taxes from digital economy and there is consensus in 
arguing that the solution to the taxation of  the digital economy should be achieved at 
a global level.
The issue has been raised and analysed in international fora, and some solutions 
for the taxation of  this new form of  economy have already been put forward. Although 
none of  them is adequate or free of  problems, we will list some solutions/options for 
taxation of  the digital economy that have been discussed at international level:
Digital Permanent Establishment:11 In the final report on Action 7 of  the 
BEPS, the OECD considered changes to Article 5 of  the Model Tax Convention 
on Income and Capital to include the concept of  digital establishment, using 
the concept of  significant economic presence. This solution immediately presents 
8 In the Opinion of  the European Economic and Social Committee on “Taxation in the digitalised economy”, of 17 
July 2019, the expert group concluded that “there should not be a special tax regime for digital companies. The 
general rules should rather be applied or adapted so that ‘digital’ companies are treated in the same way as others”.
9 “Bloomberg news”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-03/
italy-said-to-investigate-netflix-for-failing-to-file-tax-return. 
10 Is important to define the concept so it can be applied, for example, to companies such as Alphabet, 
a holding company that manages companies like Google or YouTube and creates income from 
intangible assets whose value has been generated in several countries.
11 For further developments, and since our focus is on the solutions advanced by the EU, see OECD/
G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of  Permanent 
Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/preventing-the-artificial-avoidance-of-permanent-establishment-status-action-
7-2015-final-report_9789264241220-en, 16.
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difficulties in the concept of  significant digital presence and may create more 
situations of  inequality.
Withholding tax on certain digital transactions:12 Another initiative 
considered and discussed at the international level was the introduction of  a 
definitive withholding tax on the gross revenue generated in the e-commerce 
operations of  non-resident companies. This solution raises questions as 
to its applicability in the relationship with individuals and legal issues of  
discrimination/neutrality.13
Equalisation Levy:14 This is a levy rate applicable on digital transactions 
with non-resident entities that have a significant economic presence in the 
jurisdiction of  consumption/use, in order to offset the loss of  tax revenue 
and thus place residents and non-residents on an equal tax burden. This tax 
creates some perplexity to the extent that, being levied on income rather than 
profit, it comes close to VAT. Therefore, it is a difficult tax to classify and the 
classification of  the tax is fundamental, if  only to avoid  double taxation. 
In addition, other problems may arise. Not all digital companies are as successful 
as Google or Amazon. Companies like, for example, Spotify hardly generate any 
profit, “but, since they are operating around the European Union and most people use that 
platform, based on this new ‘revenue taxation approach’, Spotify will have to pay taxes in all 
countries possible from 2020 on”.15 By introducing this new tax, digital start-ups will 
not be able to grow quickly, which could lead to a loss of  competitiveness of  the 
European Union compared to the United States or China.16
These and other solutions were identified and addressed by the OECD in the 
BEPS Action 1 Report - Addressing the Tax Challenges of  the Digital Economy of October 
2015, which left the commitment to continue working on this issue at international 
level.17
The European Union has also had the opportunity to comment on unilateral 
measures envisaged by Member States, stating that measures applied individually are 
very different in terms of  scope and justification, and may represent a greater risk of  
fragmentation of  the Single Market and distortion of  competition, constituting an 
obstacle to the development of  new digital solutions and to the competitiveness of  
the Union as a whole.18
12 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of  
Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report”, 115.
13 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of  
Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report”, 115 to 117.
14 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of  
Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 - 2015 Final Report”, 117.
15 Professor Dr. Hans van den Hurk, “Tax and Digital Economy – Will Pillar One be the Solution?”, 
The EC Tax Journal, v. 18, Feb 2020, 134.
16 European Commission, “Competition Policy for the digital era – Final report”, accessed August 20, 
2021, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.
17 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Addressing the Tax Challenges of  the 
Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report”, 151.
18 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council, “Towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in EU 
tax policy”, Strasbourg, 15.1.2019, COM(2019) 8 final, “COM (2019) 8 final”, reads “Increasingly, the 
only way that Member States can achieve their policy goals and fend off  threats to their tax bases is 
by working together”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0008&from=sl; or in the Opinion of  the European Economic and 
Social Committee on “Taxation in the digitalised economy”, where the expert group concludes that 
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The aforementioned BEPS Action 1 Report emerged in a specific context of  
fighting tax fraud and evasion in the digital economy at the request of  the G20. In 
this first report of  October 2015, the OECD analyses the different and possible 
options to address the challenges arising from the digital economy, identifying the tax 
strategies used by large multinationals to tax-base erosion.
The first action in the BEPS report, cross-cutting, is on the digital economy. 
The concept of  permanent establishment was reviewed so that companies do not, 
on one hand, benefit from this condition inappropriately and, on the other hand, 
avoid this condition whenever it is more favourable to them. Among other issues, it 
analysed the importance of  intangible assets, the use of  databases, the dissemination 
of  value chains where the different stages of  production are spread across several 
countries and the fight against tax planning by multinational companies.
In March 2018, continuing the work started in 2015, the OECD publishes 
an Interim Report – Tax Challenges arising from Digitalisation –, also dedicated to the 
challenges of  digital economy. In this 2018 Interim Report, the OECD not only 
analyses some interim measures implemented by some States, but also focuses on 
global and long-term solutions, with particular focus on the review of  nexus rules 
and profit allocation rules, aiming to align the distribution of  taxing rights among 
the different jurisdictions, according to the location of  digital economic activities 
and their value creation. Therefore, we have witnessed the first steps taken towards 
changing the basic tax criteria structured on the physical presence of  companies.
However, progress at the international level remained difficult due to the 
complex nature of  the problem, the wide range of  issues that need to be resolved 
and the fact that the different political and economic interests of  several states are 
not always easily reconcilable.
At the OECD level were divergent positions on how the issue should be 
approached. In the 2018 interim report that “there are divergent views on how the issue 
should be approached”, and “there is no consensus on the need for, or merits of, interim measures, 
with a number of  countries opposed to such measures”.19
In any case, the report expressed the intention to continue the dialogue and 
work regarding the digital economy tax challenges, in order to achieve a single and 
consensual position in 2020, after an amendment in 2019.
On 28 and 29 May 2019, the OECD approved a report — Programme of  Work 
to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of  the 
Economy, Inclusive Framework on BEPS — which contains the path travelled since then 
to find a consensual solution on this matter, recognising, however, that the solution 
still requires more in-depth economic impact studies to reach a long-term solution. 
More than this, the aforementioned report proves that the international community 
is focused on studying the problem and is committed to meet the (perhaps audacious) 
target of  reaching a consensual position by 2020.20
“any changes to the rules for allocating taxation rights of  profits among countries must be coordinated 
globally, in order to better harness the benefits of  globalisation, with proper global governance and 
global rules”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:52018IE2781&from=EN, point 1.4.
19 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation 
– Interim Report 2018. Inclusive Framework on BEPS”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264293083-en.pdf ?expires=1625572235&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=096488D3BED0CD67CF78CA83CD122078.
20 For some authors this Report already represents a relevant paradigm shift. See, for example, Hans 
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On 12 July of  2021 members of  the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) / G20 reached a consensus solution. The discussion 
focused on two broad work streams: (i) Pillar One – the partial re-allocation of  
taxing rights; and (ii) Pillar Two – the minimum effective taxation of  profits of  
Multinational Enterprises.21
3. The Digital Tax Package22
The European Commission has decided to go a step further by proposing a 
harmonised approach to solve the problem, and following a Communication presented 
in September 2017,23 has come forward with a legislative package concerning digital 
economy taxation.
In this communication, the Commission has recognised that the Digital Single 
Market is one of  the 10 political priorities of  the European Union, as it generates 
wealth for the Union, creates jobs and transforms public services. But it also 
recognises that the transformation of  business models, with intangible assets playing 
an increasingly important role, puts enormous pressure on the European tax system.
The Commission recognises that “the EU Digital Single Market needs a modern and 
stable tax framework for the digital economy to stimulate innovation, tackle market fragmentation 
and allow all players to tap into the new market dynamics under fair and balanced conditions. It is 
essential to ensure tax certainty for business   investment and to prevent new tax loopholes emerging 
in the Single Market”.24
It is also recognized that the effort must be coordinated and achieved 
at international level, but that attempts have proved insufficient. As such, the 
Commission concludes in the communication to Parliament and Council that “the 
time to act has now come. The Commission wants an ambitious EU agenda on the matter and 
a common EU approach to ensure that the digital economy is taxed effectively and in a way that 
ensures fairness and supports growth”.25
Van den Hurk, “Tax and digital economy – Will pillar one be the solution?”, when he writes the 
following: “2019 was the year in which the OECD proposed a real change in the international tax 
rules. The consultation report The Tax Challenges of  Digitalisation of  the Economy was published. It 
included some radical reforms which dealt with the main point of  discussion in international taxation 
since 1923, namely the arm’s length principle”.
21 Pillar One aims to adapt the international rules on how the taxation of  corporate profits of  the 
largest and most profitable MNE is shared amongst countries, to reflect the changing nature of  
business models, including the ability of  companies to do business without a physical presence.
Pillar Two will set a floor to excessive tax competition. It aims to ensure that multinational businesses 
are subject to a minimum effective level of  tax on all of  their profits each year. European Commission, 
“Global Agreement on Corporate Taxation: frequently asked questions”, accessed August 20, 2021, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pt/qanda_21_3564.
22 Before further developments on this particular subject, it is important to say that following the 
Global Agreement on Corporate Taxation achieved by the members of  the G20, in July 2021, the 
Commission announced that the works for implementation of  a digital tax are suspended. Nevertheless, 
it is useful to dissect these two proposals and see the work developed by the Commission.
23 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, “A fair and efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market”, 
Brussels, 21.9.2017, COM(2017) 547 final, accessed August 20, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2017:0547:FIN:EN:PDF.
24 COM(2017) 547 final.
25 COM(2017) 547 final, 3.
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Accordingly, on 21 March 2018, the Commission launched two proposals for 
Directives, the Digital Tax Package,26 which aims to add value to the international 
debate on the subject and respond to the desire to achieve a fair and equitable tax 
system in the European Union.
The Digital Tax Package encompasses the Proposal for a Council Directive 
2018/0072, which lays down rules relating to the corporate taxation of  a significant 
digital presence, and the Proposal for a Council Directive 2018/0073 on the 
common system of  a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of  
certain digital services, on which we will elaborate further.
The proposals presented are guided by a common criterion: the user value creation, 
where the number of  users, insofar as they play a predominant role in value creation, 
is one of  the main requirements in digital activities taxation.
The proposals aim to implement two different solutions: (i) a long-term solution 
consisting in extending the concept of  permanent establishment to situations of  
significant digital presence (SDP), as set out in Proposal of  a Directive 2018/0072, and 
(ii) another short-term solution aimed at creating a tax on certain revenues from 
digital activities, the Digital Service Tax (DST), introduced by Proposal for a Directive 
2018/0073.
However, due to their still embryonic nature, these forms of  taxation raise a 
variety of  issues that require constant debate, namely, and merely as an example, 
whether these measures will not result, even if  indirectly, in an unacceptable 
restriction on international trade, namely in light of  the rules of  the World Trade 
Organisation. It is therefore necessary to discuss it, both at national and international 
level, in favour of  a coordinated and sound taxation system for digital activities.
3.1. Proposal for a Directive 2018/0072 - Digital Permanent Establishment
The Proposal for Council Directive 2018/0072 (CNS), presented on 21 
March 2018, aims to address the problems raised by the digital economy through a 
comprehensive solution within the existing Member States’ corporate tax systems. It 
sets out a common system for taxing digital activities in the European Union which 
properly considers the features of  the digital economy. One of  the main objectives 
of  this proposal is to improve the resilience of  the Internal Market as a whole to 
meet the challenges of  the digital economy. As digital businesses can engage in cross-
border activities without any physical presence in a jurisdiction, rules ensuring that 
such businesses pay taxes in the places where value is generated are indispensable. It 
is recognised that a common initiative to ensure harmonised application of  tax rules 
on significant digital presence is necessary, as unilateral and divergent approaches by 
individual Member States could prove ineffective and fragment the Single Market, 
creating conflicts between national policies, as well as tax distortions and obstacles 
for businesses operating in the European Union.
Before turning to the more detailed analysis of  this proposal for a directive, 
it should be noted that the proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB) could be a solution to ensure fairer and more efficient taxation of  
companies in the European Union. However, it could not provide a structural solution 
to some of  the important challenges in digital company taxation. This is because 
the scope of  the CCCTB is limited (only mandatory for multinational companies) 
26 European Commission, “Fair taxation of  the Digital Economy”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/fair-taxation-digital-economy_en. 
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and the definition of  permanent establishment is still based on the idea of  physical 
presence. Regarding the profit attribution formula for large multinational groups, the 
approach to the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base apportionment formula 
should be adapted to also reflect digital activities.27 However, while this solution 
would not be sufficient to ensure fair taxation of  digital activities of  companies, the 
Commission has already identified the problem and is ready to work together with 
Member States and the European Parliament to examine how the provisions of  this 
proposal of  a directive can be incorporated into the CCCTB.28
The Commission therefore recommends that the rules of  this Proposal should 
be incorporated into Member States’ tax systems and into the Commission’s proposal 
for a CCCTB and should also be reflected in corresponding changes to the OECD 
Tax Convention at international level.
The proposal would broadly introduce the concept of  Digital Permanent 
Establishment into Member States’ tax systems so that they could levy corporate 
income tax on the profits of  non-resident entities attributable to a significant digital 
presence in their territory, due to a functional and independently conducted analysis 
of  physical presence.
Article 2 of  the Proposal defines the subjective scope of  application, covering 
all enterprises subject to corporate income tax, both enterprises established in the 
European Union and enterprises established outside the European Union with 
which there is no double taxation treaty with the Member State where a significant 
digital presence is identified.
If  there is a double taxation treaty between the Member State and the non-
resident State for taxation purposes, the proposal of  a directive will only apply if  
that treaty includes similar provisions on significant digital presence creating similar 
rights and obligations in relation to that jurisdiction outside the European Union 
(Article 2, second paragraph). Thus, only enterprises incorporated or established in 
a jurisdiction outside the European Union with which a double taxation treaty has 
been concluded will not be covered, to avoid any violations of  such Treaties.
Without dwelling on the merits of  this norm, we may say that the expression 
“similar provisions” can generate margin for different interpretations as to its meaning 
and scope of  application. Although it is intuitive that the concept of  “similarity” in 
27 See Proposal for Council Directive 2018/0072, 4.
28 It can be read in the Report of  22 February 2018 on the proposal for a Council directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) “As pointed out in the proposal of  16 March 
2011 for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base  (CCCTB) (7), a 
corporate tax system which treats the Union as a single market for the purpose of  computing the 
corporate  tax base of  companies would facilitate cross-border activity for  companies resident in 
the Union and promote the objective of   making it a more competitive location for investment 
internationally especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. The proposal of  2011 for a CCCTB 
focussed on the objective of  facilitating the expansion of  commercial activity for businesses within 
the Union. In addition to that objective, it should also be taken into account that a CCCTB can be 
highly effective in improving the functioning of  the internal market through countering tax avoidance 
schemes. In this light, the initiative for a CCCTB should be re-launched in order to address, on 
an equal footing, both the aspect of  business facilitation and the initiative’s function in countering 
tax avoidance. Once implemented in all Member States, a CCCTB would ensure that taxes are 
paid where profits are generated and where companies have permanent establishment. Such 
an approach would best serve the aim of  eradicating distortions in the functioning of  the internal 
market. Improving the internal market is a key factor for encouraging growth and job creation. 
The introduction of a CCCTB would improve economic growth and result in more jobs in the 
Union by reducing harmful tax competition between companies”.
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this context is one of  substantive similarity, i.e., similar rights and obligations, and 
not similarity of  wording, this should be made clear in the text. In order to solve 
some interpretative issues, the Proposal for a Directive provides, in Article 3, some 
definitions relevant for its correct application, namely what are digital services, what 
is a digital interface, what is a user and what is the tax period.
According to the Proposal for a Directive under consideration, digital services are 
those provided over the Internet or an electronic network and the nature of  which 
renders their supply essentially automated and requiring minimal intervention, and 
which would be impossible to provide in the absence of  information technology. This 
definition includes the supply of  digital products in general, services for creating or 
supporting the presence of  businesses or individuals on an electronic network, services 
automatically generated by computers over the internet or an electronic network in 
response to specific data input by recipients, among others.29
Annex III lists the exceptions, i.e., the services that fall outside the scope of  this 
Proposal for a Directive, including radio and television broadcasting services and the 
sale of  physical goods facilitated by means of  the internet or an electronic network. 
The rationale behind these exceptions is to ensure that taxation of  digital services 
is not based on the place of  consumption, but rather on where the value is created. 
And, although it is not duly densified in the proposal for a directive, the concept of  
minimal human intervention allows the exclusion, for example, of  the services provided 
by lawyers or consultants via email, as these services normally require more than 
minimal human intervention.
Another very important concept introduced by the Proposal for a Directive 
is that of  significant digital presence (Article 4). This concept is intended to introduce 
a taxable nexus in a certain jurisdiction and should be regarded as a complement to 
the existing concept of  permanent establishment. Thus, for corporate tax purposes, 
a (digital) permanent establishment is deemed to exist if  there is a significant digital 
presence through which the activity is wholly or partly carried on. And a significant 
digital presence is considered to exist, in a Member State, in a tax period, if  the activity 
carried on consists wholly or partly of  the supply of  services through a digital interface, 
where one of  the following conditions is met:
a) total revenue in a taxable period from the supply of  digital services to users 
located in a particular Member State exceeds EUR 7 000 000.
b) the number of  users of  the digital service provided exceeds 100 000.
c) the number of  business contracts for digital services concluded in a certain 
tax period by users located in that Member State exceeds 3 000.
The location of  users, as opposed to, for example, the origin of  the payment, is 
the key for determining the place of  taxation.
For the purposes of  using digital services, a user is deemed to be located in 
a Member State where they use30 their device – by reference to IP address or any 
29 Under this Proposal the scope of  taxable services is considerably broader compared to the Proposal 
for a Directive 2018/0073.
30 This concept of  access to the website or a mobile application is not clear. Is it enough for the user to click 
on the website for this click to count as relevant use of  the service? And where is the user considered to be 
located? At his or her home address? Should users travelling on business and accessing the digital interface 
in a Member State other than their residence also be counted? Or when in a flight making stopovers in 
several countries the user accesses the Internet in the various stopover countries will this count as relevant 
use of  the service for the purposes of  applying the criteria laid down in the proposal of  a directive? I 
believe that all these questions will arise in practice, since the Proposal has not densified the concepts.
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other method of  geolocation31 – to access the digital interface through which the 
service is provided.
In relation to the conclusion of  contracts, instead of  the location of  users, the 
Commission chooses the criteria of  the tax residence of  the contracting company or, 
if  the contractor resides in a third country, the existence of  a permanent establishment 
in a certain Member State.
The criteria put forward by the European Union to establish a taxable link of  a 
digital company in a certain Member State are benchmarks to determine the “digital 
footprint” of  a company in a jurisdiction based on certain indicators of  economic 
activity. In the words of  the Commission in the preamble to the Proposal for a 
Directive 2018/0072, “the criteria should cater for different types of  business models.  Digital 
business models are very heterogeneous. Some may have a very large user base while others may have a 
smaller user base, but may still have significant user contributions if  each individual user contributes 
a large value”. Further adds that “As explained in the Impact Assessment it is essential that each 
threshold is set sufficiently high to safely exclude small cases where profits attributable to a digital 
presence would not even cover the tax compliance cost for a permanent establishment, thus to ensure 
proportionality of  the measure while operating these three alternative thresholds”.
The use of  quantitative benchmarks in defining a nexus of  significant digital 
presence, while aiming to provide clarity and certainty and to create a level playing 
field for all market participants, may be considered arbitrary. Indeed, fixed figures 
regarding the existence of  a significant user base in a jurisdiction do not take into 
account the market differences between the various European Union Member States 
in terms of  geography, size of  the economy or number of  inhabitants. The chances 
of  a fixed number threshold being met in a small European Union Member State are 
limited compared to a larger one, even though non-residents potentially have a more 
extensive significant presence in the small State’s market. In particular, as regards the 
threshold of  the number of  users, it is questionable whether this benchmark relates to 
value creation by users. Not all users contribute equally to a digital enterprise, and 
the various digital models allow for a different degree of  engagement by the user. 
Furthermore, when measuring the number of  users in a certain fiscal period, it is 
unclear how long it should be located in the home jurisdiction. 
The wording of  Article 4 also seems to ignore the user’s place of  residence, 
focusing only, for the purposes of  determining where the revenue from the digital 
service supply is created, on where the user uses the services, or where business 
contracts are concluded. If  a user has to travel, either for personal or professional 
reasons, that same user may be counted more than once for the purpose of  counting 
thresholds. In addition, the same user may access the same website through multiple 
channels, which will make counting even more difficult.
In other words, although the Commission opens a way forward, there is room 
for improvement in terms of  clarifying some concepts.
As regards the attribution of  profits, the rules of  this proposal of  a directive are 
built on the current framework for permanent establishments.
The principle established is that the significant digital presence should be attributed 
to the profits it would have made if  it were a separate entity engaged in the same 
digital transaction, taking into account the functions performed, assets used and risks 
31 From a personal data protection perspective, the Commission will need to coordinate this provision 
with the Personal Data Protection Regime, in particular with that provided for in Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016.
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assumed through the digital interface.32 Thus, the functional analysis of  a significant 
digital presence should consider the activities performed through a digital interface 
related to data and users as economically significant functions for the attribution of  
economic ownership of  assets and risks to the digital permanent establishment. The 
total profits earned shall be calculated by attributing profits proportionally to the 
number of  times devices are used to access the digital interface through which the 
covered services are provided. 
This provision aims to ensure that, in the context of  digital activities, the 
attribution of  profit to significant digital presence reflects the value created through 
the services provided. Such a situation occurs where a significant digital presence 
operates through a digital interface without any physical presence or without any 
significant human function. The attribution of  profit should take into account the 
development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of  intangible 
assets in the performance of  the economically significant activities by the digital 
presence even if  these are not linked to people functions in the same Member State. 
The Proposal for a Directive, in the detailed explanation of  the provisions, 
provides an example of  this Article 5: “in attracting new users to a social network, the set of  
intangible assets that would be attributable to the business of  the social network plays a key part 
in guaranteeing the positive network externalities, i.e., that the users are able to connect to a large 
number of  other users. (...) This set of  intangibles would be further   enhanced by the processing 
of  user-level data to enable the social network to sell advertising space at a premium since the 
advertising space is customised to the interests of  the users.”33
It follows that each of  the economically relevant activities contributes to the 
creation of  value of  the digital business model and is an integral part of  it. The 
profit split method, in the EU perspective set out in this proposal for a directive, 
would appear to be the most appropriate for allocating profits to significant digital 
presence.34
In order to examine questions concerning the application of  the Proposal for 
a Directive and to evaluate its implementation, the Commission agreed to set up an 
advisory committee called DigiTax, composed of  representatives of  the Member 
States and of  the Commission and chaired by a Commission representative.
This Proposal for a Directive is an acknowledgement of  the need for a paradigm 
shift in the international tax system.
However, what the Commission has done was establish the bases on which 
concepts such as significant digital presence or digital services would be constructed, 
leaving the definition of  their more specific contours to the competent international 
bodies.35
The traditional rules of  International Tax Law require the determination of  
some criteria connecting the taxing power. The concept of  permanent establishment 
is the main territorial connection criterion that allows the exercise of  the taxing power, 
ensuring a fair balance between the exclusive taxation of  the State of  residence and 
the State of  source, where the income was effectively created.
32 See detailed explanation of  the specific provisions of  Proposal for a Directive 2018/0072, 9. 
33 Considering the role of  users and their data in a functional analysis of  imputing risks and assets (and 
ultimately profits) to the digital permanent establishment is consistent with the significant role that 
users play as a value driver of  digital business models.
34 It is worth noting that the profit split method is, like all other transfer pricing methods, a 
“transactional” method.
35 Certainly, convinced that a solution on this issue will have to be taken at global and not regional level.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 7, No. 1,  July 2021
132 Marina Barata
The traditional concept of  permanent establishment must be rethought to 
ensure that, through the location of  its users, a company – whose activity relies on 
the use of  a digital platform – is recognised as having a significant digital presence 
and thus provide the Member State where that digital footprint occurs with taxing 
powers that allow it to access its share of  the taxes relating to the business/digital 
activities carried out on its territory.
The Proposal for a Directive has also not foreseen how companies that provide 
services or sell digital and non-digital goods may be subject to double taxation, 
at source and at residence, which we believe should be distinguished. Moreover, 
the three criteria regarding the amount of  revenue earned, number of  users and 
number of  business contracts concluded – which are applied cumulatively – do not 
reflect the concept of  permanence over time, which is typical of  the traditional 
permanent establishment concept. It might be appropriate to add a time criterion, to 
exclude certain one-off  arrangements from tax liability, and to revisit the figures now 
provided on an annual basis to ensure that they are in line with reality.
Despite these considerations, it is easy to see the Commission’s difficulty in 
creating clear and concise rules that, at the same time, cover the whole range of  
taxable situations in the digital economy. Nonetheless, it seems that the proposal 
points out the most relevant digital services, focusing on the creation of  value by 
users and on the operations carried out through a digital interface related with data 
from those same users, which are, perhaps, the most relevant activities in the scope 
of  goods and services provided by this type of  businesses.
3.2. Common System of a Digital Services Tax — Proposal for a Directive 
2018/0073
In parallel, and pending the adoption of  a comprehensive solution, and to avoid 
the adoption of  divergent unilateral measures by Member States that may weaken the 
Single Market, the European Commission has also presented, as an interim solution, 
the Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of  a digital services tax 
on revenues resulting from the provision of  certain digital services — 2018/0073 
(CNS).
The Proposal for a Directive no. 2018/0073 introduces an indirect tax (the 
DST), at a rate of  3%, levied on gross revenues arising from the provision of  certain 
digital services.
It differs from the Proposal for a Directive 2018/0072 (CNS) since its scope 
is much narrower. The Proposal for a Directive 2018/0073 creates a tax, levied on 
revenues derived from the provision of  certain digital services, characterised by the 
creation of  value by the user. Digital services should be those that depend to a large 
extent on the creation of  value by the user, where the difference between the place 
where the profits are taxed and the place where the users are established is generally 
greater. The value subject to taxation is the revenue36 from processing the user input, 
not the user participation itself.
36 On this subject Hans Van den Hurk, “Tax and Digital Economy – Will pillar one be the solution?”, 
134: “should a tax based on revenues not be considered a VAT? I tend to think so. (…) In my humble 
opinion I like to refer to the expression if  it looks like a duck, it sounds like a duck and it walks like a duck, 
it might as well be a duck”.
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As regards the objective scope, the proposal of  a directive specifies the digital 
services whose revenues are subject to the tax: 
a) The placing on a digital interface 37 of  advertising targeted at users38 of  that 
interface;
b) The making available of  multi-sided digital interfaces to users to find other 
users and to interact with them, and which may also facilitate the provision of  
underlying supplies of  goods or services directly between users (also referred 
to as “intermediation services”);39
c) And the transmission of  data collected from users and generated from the 
activities of  those users on digital interfaces.
Is important to clarify that, according to Article 3(7) of  the Proposal for a 
Directive, any revenues derived from the provision of  services to another group 
company are excluded from the scope of  the tax. In other words, the tax is levied 
only on revenues derived from the provision of  digital services to third parties, 
whether companies or individuals.
Article 3 of  this Proposal for a Directive extensively delimits the object of  the 
tax, and, in my opinion, especially if  we consider the explanatory notes to this article, 
the line separating taxable and non-taxable services remains somewhat blurred. 
However, the main idea is that the revenue derived from the provision of  certain 
digital services is the revenue derived from the value created by users and not from 
the digital service itself.
The location of  the user is again fundamental since it is where value is created.
According to Article 5 of  the Proposal for a Directive, and in line with the 
concept of  value creation by users, which underpins the scope of  the tax, the tax 
would be levied by the Member State where the users are located, regardless of  
whether the user has contributed in cash to the generation of  the revenue. 
Similarly, to Proposal of  a Directive 2018/0072, the location of  users is done 
based on the IP (Internet Protocol) address of  the device used, or by any other 
means of  geolocation that proves to be more accurate.40
When users, involved in a taxable digital service, are located in different Member 
States or in jurisdictions outside the European Union, the Proposal for a Directive 
determines that taxable revenues obtained through the provision of  such services 
should be distributed proportionately among each Member State.
To manage the administrative aspects related to the payment of  this tax, the 
Proposal for a Directive provides for the creation of  a One-Stop-Shop. This is based 
on the idea that the taxable person with DST liability should have a single contact 
point (the Member State of  identification) where he or she will have to comply with 
all obligations relating to the tax – namely identification, submission of  the return 
and payment of  the DST – and the Member State of  identification is responsible 
37 Digital interface is defined in Article 2(3) of  the Proposal for a Directive as “any software, including a 
website or a part thereof  and applications, including mobile applications, accessible by users”.
38 The concept of  user can be found in Article 2(4) and means any individual or business.
39 In this regard, the Proposal for a Directive explanatory note clarifies that the difference between 
a supplier selling goods or services online for his own account or providing intermediation services 
would be determined by taking into account the legal and economic substance of  a transaction.
40 According to Article 5(6) only data indicating the Member State where users are located should 
be shared, without allowing those users to be identified. This provision was introduced perhaps to 
mitigate potential conflicts that could arise regarding the protection of  personal data, in particular the 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016.
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for sharing this information with other Member States where the tax is due and for 
transferring the proportion collected on behalf  of  those States.
The fact that a taxable person is resident for the purpose of  paying corporate 
income tax in a Member State has no impact on the determination of  the Member State 
of  identification for the purpose of  paying DST – given the different nature of  the tax. 
Thus, the Member State of  identification should be the State where the DST is due, 
except in cases where the tax is due in more than one State, in which case the taxpayer 
may choose the respective Member State of  identification. Despite these provisions, 
the DST is due directly to each Member State, which means that the Member State 
concerned has the right to enforce its payment against the taxable person liable for the 
tax and to carry out tax audits and control measures.
The subjective scope of  the Proposal for a Directive is delimited by Article 4, 
which defines who is subject to the tax.
As provided in Article 2 of  this Proposal for a Directive, any person or entity, 
regardless of  their legal form or State of  residence, may be subject to DST, provided 
that they meet (cumulatively) two discriminative criteria.
The first criterion relates to the size of  the entity: entities which, in a tax period, 
have total global revenues greater than EUR 750 000 000 are subject to the tax.
The second criterion relates to the “digital footprint” of  the entity within the 
European Union, in that entities are subject to the tax if, in a tax period, their total 
taxable income within the European Union exceeds EUR 50 000 000.41
The first threshold (total annual global revenues) limits the application of  this 
tax to companies of  a certain size, which are the ones establishing strong market 
positions that allows them to benefit from the network effects and the exploitation of  
big data. Moreover, the opportunities for aggressive tax planning lie with the largest 
companies. This threshold is intended to bring legal certainty and make it easier and 
less burdensome for businesses and tax administrations to determine an entity’s DST 
obligation, excluding small businesses and start-ups from the obligation of  yet another 
tax that could even become disproportionate. The second threshold (total annual 
revenues in the Union) is intended to limit the application of  the tax to cases where 
there is already a strong “digital footprint” at EU level.
An obvious criticism of  the application of  these thresholds is that they may 
discourage growth beyond this level of  revenue. Furthermore, subjecting a company 
to a 3% levy on gross revenues can be significant, even at the revenue scale of  750 
million euros, since the profit margins may be very small.
The second criterion is applied to exclude from the DST scope those big 
companies that, in spite of  their size, have an “irrelevant” number of  digital services 
in the European Union. But we will say that, while it is relatively simple to assess the 
revenue threshold by looking at the company’s financial statements, assessing such a 
digital footprint is anything but straightforward. When we talk about digital services, 
regarding a company that operates globally is difficult to know what taxable revenues 
are earned within the EU just by looking at the company’s financial statements.
However, the fact is that this interim solution provided for by the Proposal for 
a Directive 2018/0073 offers a balanced response to, on the one hand, the Member 
States’ taxation requirements and, on the other hand, the healthy economic growth, 
41 It seems to me that this requirement is quite interesting since it applies to revenue obtained in the 
European Union and not in a particular Member State.
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insofar as it presents a stable tax framework for companies active in the European 
Union.
So much so that this type of  tax has already been implemented in countries 
like France (3%), Austria (5%), Spain (3%), Hungary (7.5%), Italy (3%) and Poland 
(1.5%). And while, for example, Austria and Hungary only tax revenues from online 
advertising, in France the taxable base is much broader, including revenues from the 
provision of  digital interfaces or targeted advertising.42  
In Portugal, the proposal to create a tax on certain digital services presented by 
the party Bloco de Esquerda was not accepted.43  
The abovementioned proposals should have been transposed by the Member 
States by 31 December 2019, and the transpositions should apply from 1 January 
2020. To this date, that transposition process has not taken place, most likely due to 
a lack of  unanimity on the matter. 
4. Conclusion 
The legislative framework presented by the Commission will have to be reviewed 
once the members of  the G20 translate the Global Agreement into a multilateral 
convention.44 
Although different in scope, both proposals for directives demonstrate a strong 
concern from the Commission to close this legislative loophole that encourages tax 
planning and avoidance by technological companies.
It should be noted that tax systems need to take due account of  new business 
models, and there is a strong belief  that any change to the rules for distributing 
taxing rights between countries should be coordinated on a global scale, otherwise 
this will result in double taxation and, consequently, a reduction in investment and 
jobs. However, if  an international solution cannot be reached, the European Union 
should consider (as it has through these two Proposals for Directives), to move 
forward alone.45  
What the European Economic and Social Committee noted, in its own-initiative 
opinion on “Taxation in the digitalised economy” of  17 July 2019, and which seems 
interesting to reproduce, is that the “discussion regarding the taxation of  so-called digital 
companies does not primarily relate to base erosion and profit shifting behaviour of  companies but 
to the allocation of  taxation rights among countries”.46  
Legislation, regarding taxation, is closely linked to national sovereignty given 
the role this matter plays in national revenue, state budgets and political choices. 
42 Elke Asen, “What European OECD countries are doing about Digital Services Taxes”, Tax 
Foundation, March 25, 2021, accessed August 20, 2021, https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-
europe-2020/. 
43 Projecto de Lei no. 1123/XIII/4.ª (BE), accessed August 20, 2021, https://bit.ly/3jStTCK 
44 Once there is a consensus-based global agreement on both Pillars, the Commission will move 
swiftly to propose measures for their implementation in the EU, in line with the EU’s tax agenda 
and the needs of  the Single Market. European Commission, “Global Agreement on Corporate 
Taxation: frequently asked questions”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/pt/qanda_21_3564. 
45 Opinion of  the European Economic and Social Committee on “Taxation in the digitalised economy” 
(2019/C 353/04), accessed August 20, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/PD
F/?uri=CELEX:52018IE2781&from=EN. 
46 Opinion of  the European Economic and Social Committee on “Taxation in the digitalised 
economy”, accessed August 20, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri
=CELEX:52018IE2781&from=EN, 4.6. 
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Taxation is the last EU policy area where decision-making is based exclusively on 
unanimity.47
However, the unanimity rule48 prevents taxation from fulfilling the goal of  
preserving the Single Market and supporting inclusive growth in different countries. 
Taxation is essential for building a strong and dynamic Single Market, for attracting 
businesses and investors, generating jobs, and influencing business decisions of  
expanding. Essentially, it is a key element in ensuring social justice.
But to achieve this, it is essential that tax systems are uniform within the 
European Union.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that in this area, unanimity in tax matters has 
proved counterproductive. It is legitimate to ask, if  one Member State can veto a tax 
initiative sought by the other 26 Member States, to what extent the can unanimity 
rule defend the sovereignty of  these 26 Member States.
The alternative would be to change the voting requirements to qualified 
majority regarding European Union tax policy. And the fact is that the Treaties 
contain provisions allowing recourse to procedures other than unanimity, without 
being necessary to amend the Treaty itself.
Take, for example, the enhanced cooperation procedure,49 which allows a 
group of  at least nine Member States to propose an initiative jointly when unanimous 
agreement cannot be reached in the Council; or Article 116 of  the TFEU, which 
allows qualified majority voting with ordinary legislative procedure to eliminate 
distortions of  competition due to different national tax rules if  this cannot be 
resolved in agreement with the Member States.50 And perhaps the most practical way 
of  moving from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting without amending 
the Treaties would be to use the so-called “bridging clauses”’ in the Treaties.51
Moving to qualified majority voting would not affect Member States’ existing 
powers in the area of  taxation. It would only change the decision-making procedure 
applicable in the future, as agreed unanimously by Member States exercising their 
sovereignty.52  
It is clear that the digital economy poses more profound questions other than 
how it is taxed, as it implies the need for more effective legislation on the European 
Union tax policy.
47 The Single European Act, of  1986, which entered into force on 1 July 1987, in relation to voting 
matters replaced unanimity by qualified majority as the general rule for harmonising single market 
rules. This was followed by further steps extending qualified majority voting to a wide range of  
policies, including judicial cooperation in civil matters, harmonisation in the field of  criminal law 
and police cooperation. Moreover, taxation is still one of  the few areas where decisions are taken by 
a special legislative procedure, taxation initiatives are taken by the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission, and the European Parliament has a purely consultative role. 
48 According to Articles 113 and 115 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union 
(TFEU), the rule is that the Council must act unanimously on tax proposals under the special legislative 
procedure. Also, Articles 192(2), first subparagraph, and 194(3) TFEU establish that provisions of  
a primarily fiscal nature regarding environment and energy should be adopted unanimously by the 
Council in accordance with the special legislative procedure. 
49 Article 20 of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 326 to 334 of  the TFEU.   
50 This provision, which has not been used to date, is subject to strict conditions and does not resolve 
all the shortcomings that currently arise from the unanimity rule in tax matters. 
51 In accordance with Article 48(7) TEU the Council may adopt a decision authorising the Council to 
act by qualified majority in that area or in that case. Any initiative taken by the European Council shall 
be sent to national Parliaments to oppose it within a period of  six months. 
52 COM(2019) 8 final, 12. 
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No progress is being made on tax matters in the European Union, or the one 
made is slow, because there is no unanimity or consensus between the Member 
States on these matters. But unanimity is no longer a practical and effective way 
of  making decisions. National interests and those of  the European community are 
intertwined, and perhaps moving to qualified majority voting on tax matters could 
help end this deadlock and bring some legal certainty and stability to businesses 
across the European Union.
International bodies must continue the debate on this issue to achieve a system 
that is fair, proportional and, most importantly, adapted to the digital reality. However, 
more than debate, action is needed. The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework will take 
a final decision on the remaining issues and will agree on an implementation plan by 
October 2021, and once the terms of  the agreement are settled, it will be important 
that the European Union ensures its implementation in a consistent way across the 
Member States. 
